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Abstract. As Cloud software (Software-as-a-Service) become more and more 
ubiquitous, the scale and performance expectations become an important factor 
impacting architectural decisions for security protocol adoption.  WS-Trust[6] 
and WS-Federation[7] are enterprise scale protocols but lacked wide adoption 
due to complexity.  OAuth 1.0 emerged as an industry standard for unifying 
identity management for major SaaS players.   However, OAuth 1.0 soon was 
proven to fail performance criteria for enterprise adoption.  With the 
introduction of OAuth 2.0 some of the performance concerns were addressed.  
This paper proposes an optimization to OAuth 2.0 for enterprise adoption.  This 
optimization is achieved by introducing manageability steps to pre-establish 
trust amongst the client and the protected resource server.  In this model, the 
client needs to set up trust with the protected resource server as well as with the 
authorization server. These clients are called highly trusted clients.  We believe 
such optimization makes it feasible to adopt OAuth in the enterprise where 
scale and performance are critical factors. 
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1   Introduction 
OAuth is a claim-based security protocol that enables users to grant third-party access 
to their protected resources without sharing their passwords. OAuth 1.0 [1] was 
published in December 2007 and quickly become the industry standard for web-based 
access delegation.  However, OAuth 1.0 faced lots of challenges to make it into the 
enterprise domain mainly due to the lack of performance optimization capabilities 
currently on offer by the protocol.  Microsoft, Google, and other large organizations 
[3] proposed OAuth WRAP (Web Resource Authorization Profiles) to solve the 
performance challenges and facilitate adoption by the enterprise.  One of the main 
optimizations is the introduction of an independent Authorization Server.  OAuth 
adopted the WRAP recommendation into OAuth 2.0.  In this work, we introduce an 
additional optimization where the Authorization Server is configured with explicit 
authorization table so that access grants are rejected at the Authorization Server 
before getting to the protected resource server.  This reduces the amount of processing 
some popular protected resources servers would have to do and alleviates the risk of 
potential threats such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and Distributed DoS 
(DDoS). 
In the next section, we discuss the drivers behind the introduction of 
OAuth2.0 and present its architecture. In section 3, we argue the modifications 
suggested to OAuth2.0 in order to facilitate Enterprise adoption of the protocol. 
Section 4 then provides preliminary results from experiments currently being 
conducted using the modified version of OAuth2.0. Finally, section 5 rounds off the 
paper by providing a preview of planned future work. 
 
2   Introduction to OAuth 2.0 
Although OAuth 2.0 is a new protocol, it still retains the overall architecture and 
approach established by the previous versions. As large providers started using OAuth 
1.0, the community realized that the protocol does not scale well. It required: state 
management across different steps; temporary credentials management; and provided 
no isolation of the Authorization server from the protected resource itself. In addition, 
OAuth 1.0 required that the protected resources’ endpoints have access to the client 
credentials in order to validate the request. This broke the typical architecture of most 
large providers in which a centralized authorization server is used for issuing 
credentials, and a separate server is used for API calls. OAuth 1.0 required the use of 
both sets of credentials: the client credentials and the token credentials, which made 
the separation very hard [2]. 
As the deployment of Cloud hosted enterprise software evolves (such as 
Exchange Online and SharePoint Online), there is a growing trend for a variety of 
applications to access resources through an API over HTTP or other protocols.  Often 
these resources require authorization for access to such Protected Resources.  The 
systems that are trusted to make authorization decisions may be independent from the 
Protected Resources for scalability and security reasons.  The OAuth Web Resource   
Authorization Profiles (OAuth WRAP) enable a Protected Resource to delegate the 
authorization to access a Protected Resource to one or more trusted authorities.  
Clients that wish to access a Protected Resource first obtain authorization from a 
trusted authority (Authorization Server).  Different credentials and profiles can be 
used to obtain this authorization, but once authorized the Client is provided with an 
Access Token, and possibly a Refresh Token to obtain new Access Tokens.  The 
Authorization Server typically includes authorization information in the Access 
Token and digitally signs the Access Token.  The Protected Resource can verify that 
an Access Token received from a Client was issued by a trusted Authorization Server 
and is valid.  The Protected Resource can then examine the contents of the Access 
Token to determine the authorization that has been granted to the Client. 
The following figure1below shows the architecture for OAuth 2.0 with an 
independent Authorization Server. 
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Fig. 1. OAuth 2.0 Architecture 
 
3   Enterprise Integration 
 
It is often required for servers to integrate with each other and exchange protected 
data.  An example of this is the integration with the Microsoft Exchange Server.  A 
third party may want to develop an application to access its users’ mail boxes (for 
archiving or other scenarios that can be monetized).  Since the Exchange mailbox is a 
highly protected resource with high business impact, it may not want to hand its 
mailbox data to any application with a valid token.  In a non-enterprise environment, 
all you need is a paid account to have access.  For example, Amazon may allow 
access to its listings for anyone who is willing to pay an integration price, while 
Microsoft Exchange Server wants to consider Tokens for applications that have pre-
established trust.  Also since Exchange server can host millions of users in the Cloud 
in a Shared Tenancy [5] model, request for access with valid tokens can easily burden 
the server.   
In our proposal, shown in Figure 2 below, we are working on adding a pre-
established trust between the Client (C1) and the Protected Resource (PR1) which can 
reduce many of the unwanted requests to the Protected Resource (PR1) shown in 
figure 1 above.  
Authorization Server
AS1
Protected Resource
PR1
Client
C1
3
Get Token
2
Pre-established Trust
& Synchronized Authorization
4
Request Resource
(Pass a Token)
1
Pre-established Authorization
 
Figure 2. OAuth 2.0 Modified Architecture 
 
In order to do this, we built an Authorization Server and set up an Authorization 
Table as shown in Table 1 below.  This table is replicated on the Authorization Server 
as well the Protected Resource where Authorization Server can only issue tokens to 
C1, and C2 and the Protected Resource can only accept tokens issued by C1, and C2.  
Table 1. Authorization Table 
Issuer AppliesTo 
C1 https://PR1.com 
C2 https://PR2.com 
C3 https://PR3.com 
  
  
 
 
During trust establishment (Step 1 in Figure 1 above), the Protected Resource 
(PR1) sets this table.  In return, the Authorization Server will only issue tokens to 
Issuers in the table.  If, for example, C3 comes with a request, it will not be granted a 
token since it does not have an entry in the table, in other words, C3 needs to be 
provisioned to be trusted by the protected resource PR1 in order for the Authorization 
Server to issue tokens. 
A second optimization we have designed is the introduction of additional 
parameters to the Token itself.  In this optimization, we added the AppliesTo 
parameter.  When C1 requests a Token from AS1, it will be receiving a token with 
AppliesTo parameter addressed to PR1 so that C1 cannot play the Token to any other 
protected resource. This provides an additional layer of security by ensuring that AS1 
is only issuing tokens with pre-established handshake between the client and the 
protected resource and reduces the number of unwanted attempts to authenticate.  For 
example PR1 can build an interface to allow only clients request with pre-established 
trust and thus rejecting many of the unwanted claims without putting additional load 
on the protected resource. In the example above, the token will be addressed to 
Https://PR1 and cannot be played to any other server.  This ensures that the token 
was intended for this protected resource.  All tokens without the matching AppliesTo 
parameter will be rejected by the protected resource server PR1.  If performance 
optimization is a high priority, highly trusted application may be allowed to use a wild 
card in the AppliesTo parameter.  In this case, the client can reuse the token to play 
the token to other protected resources in the enterprise.  For example, if a client is 
accessing SharePoint server, Exchange Server, and SAP server within the same 
enterprise, it may need to issue a single token from the authorization server with 
‘AppliesTo = *’, this reduces the round trips the client needs to make to the 
authorization server. 
 
3   Conclusion and Future Work 
 
As a consumer centric authentication protocol, OAuth is light-weight, secure, and 
simple identity management protocol.  With some optimization, it can become 
ubiquitous model for enterprise adoption.  In this paper we have shown an 
optimization that can significantly reduce unwanted authentication claims and 
potentially can prevent a DoS type of threat.  To better leverage OAuth 2.0 in the 
enterprise, we proposed two optimizations, one by requiring pre-established 
authorization table between the client and the protected resource, and the other one by 
allowing highly trusted clients to play tokens to more than one protected resource 
within a single enterprise and thus reducing the round trips a client needs to make to 
the authorization server. 
In future work, we plan to show how the two modifications suggested were 
proven useful using a case study.  In order to do so, we want to simulate Exchange 
Server accepting tokens for clients requesting access to their mailboxes.  The clients 
will have to pre-register trust with Exchange Server.  Additional optimization we plan 
to introduce include caching tokens and reusing them on behalf of other users trusted 
by the client within the valid lifetime of a token.  
References 
1. OAuth 1.0, http://oauth.net/core/1.0/#anchor1 
2. OAuth, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#page-14 
3. OAuth WRAP, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01 
4. Wang Bin, Huang He Yuan, Liu Xiao Xi, Xy Jing Min:  Open Identity Management 
Framework for SaaS Ecosystem. In: ICEBE 09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE 
International Confernece on e-Businness Engineering. 
5. Ye Hu, Johnny Wong, Gabriel Iszlai and Marin Litoiu: Resource Provisioning for Cloud 
Computing.  In: Proceedings of CASCON 2009, November 2009. 
6. WS-Trust, http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-trust-1.3-os.html  
7. WS-Federation, http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/bb498017.aspx 
 
 
